Watergate and the Law Schools

DONALD T. WECKSTEIN*

Senator Talmadge: Now, will you look at exhibit No. 34-47 . . .
it is a list of all of the people that you thought had violated the
law and what the laws may be that they violated, is that correct?
Mr. John W. Dean, III: That is correct.
Sen. Talmadge: Now, you have a star by Mr. Mitchell's name and
no star by Mr. Magruder ....
Mr. Dean: [A]fter I did the list-just my first reaction was there
certainly are an awful lot of lawyers involved here. So I put a
little asterisk beside each lawyer ....
Sen. Talmadge: Any significance to the star? That they are all
lawyers?
Mr. Dean: No, that was just a reaction myself, the fact that how
in God's name could so many lawyers get involved in something
like this?'
From that moment on June 26, 1973 the national scandal which
we call Watergate became a particularly embarrassing tragedy for
the legal profession. It is unfortunately true that approximately
half of the individuals indicted or convicted for Watergate-related
crimes are lawyers, and this does not include the recently resigned
* Unindicted lawyer; Dean and Professor of Law, University of San
Diego; B.B.A., University of Wisconsin; J.D., University of Texas; LL.M.,
Yale University.
1. Hearings Before the Select Comm. on PresidentialCampaign Activities of the United States Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Phase I, Watergate
Investigation,Bk. 3, at 1053-54 (1973).
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President, Vice-President, and scattered other lawyers whose involvement in Watergate and other criminal behavior and "dirty
tricks" have been widely suspected.
Of course, it is true that many of the heroes of the Watergate investigations and prosecutions are also lawyers: Cox, Jaworski
(former American Bar Association president), Richardson, Ruckleshaus, Sirica, Ervin and other members of the Senate Watergate
and House Judiciary Committees.
But it is normal to highlight the lawyer villains and not the
heroes. Lawyers have never been popular. Carl Sandburg speculated: "Why is there always a secret singing when a lawyer cashes2
in? Why does a hearse horse snicker hauling a lawyer away?
Dickens ridiculed lawyers' avarice and interminable delays, and
Shakespeare recognized the priority of killing all the lawyers for
a revolution to succeed.3 More scientific surveys of public opinion
reveal that in the United States lawyers have had a mixed but unimpressive reception. A 1940 survey in California regarded lawyers'
ethics and honesty as worse than that of people in general. 4 More
recent surveys have ranked lawyers high with regard to professional ability but lower than most other recognized professions in
regard to general reputation and truthfulness,5 although lawyers
seem to enjoy a better public image than politicians and those who
help create the profession's image, television and newspaper commentators.6
It may be that the nature of the lawyer's calling, no matter how
honorable it appears to the profession, inevitably leads to public disdain and distrust. Affording criminal defendants their right to due
process of law by zealous representation, representing all shades of
unpopular clients, influencing and deciding controversies in which
one or more parties must become losers, and largely operating the
processes of government, with all of its negative and "Big Brother"
connotations, important as these tasks may be to society, are not
calculated to win friends and favorably influence people. Woodrow
Wilson's observation may be more apt today: "Society was always
ready to be prejudiced against [lawyers]; now it finds its prejudice
confirmed."'7
2. C. SANDBURG, THE LAwy Es KNow Too MUCH (1920).
3. W. SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY VI, Part II, Act IV, Scene II

1590).

(circa

4. See 0. PmiLLPS & P. McCoy, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAwYERS ix
(1952).
5. E.g., The Missouri Bar Survey, summarized at 8 AM. BAR NEWS 34 (No. 6, June 15, 1963).
6. Id.
7. W. Wilson, The Lawyer and the CQmmunity, 35 A.BA. R EPORTs 419,
426 (1910).
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Nevertheless, the misdeeds of the Watergate lawyers involve
more than image tarnishing. A large number of the showcase
successes of the profession have acted unethically, dishonestly, corruptly, and criminally. But out of the debris of these fallen 'idols
an opportunity for professional reform, more favorable than perhaps at any other time in our history, has arisen.
The public spotlight and pressures are now causing all elements
of the legal profession to pay careful heed to the voices of critics
which in the recent past were lost in the wilderness or on the dusty
shelves of law library stacks. It has been more than five years since
Ralph Nader commented upon the incestuous relation between
lawyers and government, observing that the lawyer was the most
irresponsible factor in the equation of special interest and the
government "because he hides behind the client-lawyer relationship
to pursue all kinds of anti-social policies. ' 8 And we are now rediscovering the excellent 1970 report of Justice Tom Clark's American
Bar Association Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement which found
the existence of a scandalous situation that requires the immediate
attention of the profession. With few exceptions, the prevailing
attitude of lawyers toward disciplinary enforcement ranges from
apathy to outright hostility. Disciplinary action is practically nonexistent in many jurisdictions; practices and procedures are antiquated; many disciplinary agencies
have little power to take effective steps aginst malefactors. 9
Not only is the disciplinary effort against Watergate offenders
and others being stepped up, but general reform of the profession's
competence, ethics, and fee structure is being prodded from within
and without. Justice Department threats against anti-competitive
practices and the verbal indictments of Senator Turney's subcommittee investigating the profession are matched by the down-toearth but eloquent scoldings of Chesterfield Smith, immediate past
president of the American Bar Association, and other national and
local Bar leaders.
The current ABA president, James D. Fellers, as well as Justice
Clark, are among the numerous members of the Bar and the press
who have focused on legal education, and more particularly lack of
8. Donovan &Wise, Where to Look for Another Fortas Scandal, 50 TRUE,
Sept. 1969, No. 388 at 29, 106.
9. ABA SPECIAL Comm. ox EVALUATION OF DIscIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1 (1970).

ethics inculcation, as both a whipping post and a partial potential
salvation for many of the profession's moral maladies.
It is quite natural that in attempting to analyze and reform the
profession attention should be focused on the one thing that
virtually all lawyers have in common, a law school education. Unfortunately, however, their confidence in the curative effects of an
improved legal education is largely misplaced. The press asks, and
the Bar demands to know: "Why the law schools don't teach ethics
anymore?" And many seek rules to make sure they do.
Regrettably, these charges and hopes rest upon two erroneous
assumptions: (1) Law schools do not teach ethics; (2) It would
make a difference if they did. In fact, the law schools do teach
ethics, probably more and better than ever in their history. But
teaching ethics or other such minor tampering with the law school
curriculum is unlikely to have significant influence on the professional behavior of law school graduates, particularly when engaged
in activities of the type which led to the opportunity for involvement in the Watergate debacle and its subsequent cover-up.
EXTENT AND EFFECT OF ETHICS INSTRUCTION

The most complete study of the extent of legal ethics instruction
in law schools was conducted by Professor LeRoy Lamborn for the
American Bar Foundation in 1962-63.10 He found that 77% of the
then 134 ABA accredited law schools offered a course in legal ethics
or professional responsibility, and, of these, 84% required the course
and 88% gave credit for it. In addition, he found that more than
80% of law schools claimed to expose their students to ethical considerations through the pervasive method in courses devoted to a
wide variety of subjects, through legal clinic programs, through
organized lectures and discussion groups with members of the
practicing bar and judiciary, and through an assortment of cocurricular activities such as honor systems, orientation programs,
recommended reading lists, and student bar involvement. In 196768, other surveys revealed that of the 115 member schools of the
Association of American Law Schools, 79% offered a course in legal

profession or ethics and 76% of these required the course," and of
125 of the 152 ABA accredited schools replying to a questionnaire,
93% indicated that they offered one or more courses designed "to
10. L. LAMBORN, LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A SURVEY OF CURRENT METHODS OF INSTRUCTION IN AmERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 3-11

(Amer. Bar Found. 1963).
11. Del Duca, Continuing Evaluation of Law School Curricula-AnInitial
Survey, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 309, 320-332 (1968).
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promote pride in the profession and elevation of ethical standards.,,12
Another indication of the growing interest in professional responsibility by American law schools is the fact that 446 professors
now list themselves as teachers of legal profession in the 160 law
schools surveyed. 13 This compares with 58 teachers in 91 approved
law schools prior to World War II, in 1939-40,14 or an increase of
779% in legal ethics teachers while the number of law schools less
than doubled. Of course, this has been accompanied by a large
growth in the number of law students, as well as law teachers, but
their percentage increase has only been about half of that of
teachers of legal ethics.
If it therefore can be acknowledged that law schools are giving
extensive and increasing attention to instruction in legal ethics,
what effect has this had upon law school graduates and what effect
can it reasonably be expected to have in the future? Unfortunately,
the existing studies on these questions provide little basis for
optimism. 15 Lawyer-sociologist Jerome Carlin, in his study of the
ethics of the New York City Bar, concludes that it is most unlikely
".. . that commitment to professional norms and values can be
learned in the course of professional training . ... 1-6He further
states that it is naive for legal educators to assume that even if such
a commitment could be acquired in law school, the graduate would
be disposed to conform to such ethical standards in the practice of
law. Lawyers ethical behavior, according to Carlin, is determined
by "inner disposition" and "situational controls". Carlin suggests
that even if the ethical rules were properly defined, effectively internalized, and actively enforced, they still might not be faithfully
observed because of lack of attention
to and control of the social
17
context in which they operate.
12. Report of the Comm. on Education for Professional Responsibility,
App. A, Part 1, A.A.L.S. Proceeding, Part One, at 23, 26 (1968).
13. 1974 DIRECTORY OF LAW TEAcHERS 882-85 (A.A.L.S.).
14. 1939-40 DIRECTORY OF LAW TECHERS.

15. See survey of the studies in E. Smith, Some Sociological and Psycho-

logical Problems in Education for Professional Responsibility in EDUCATION
IN THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 295-304 (D. Weckstein
ed., U. Va. Pr. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Weckstein].
16. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS, A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR
4, 6 (Russel Sage Found. 1966).

17. Id. at 6.

Thus, Carlin found a bifurcated New York Bar. Those who were
born into more established and affluent families, attended more
prestigious colleges and law schools, and secured jobs in large firms
with continuing clientele adhered to higher standards of ethics than
those lacking such favorable background factors and struggling to
attract one-shot clients in fields like personal injury, domestic relations, and criminal law.
As applied to the Watergate culprits, it may not be unreasonable
to suggest that the ethical tone set by the administration which
they were serving and the political morals of the market place in
which they were operating .provided situational controls which
significantly influenced their unethical behavior.
One's inner disposition, or basic moral fiber, while potentially
subject to continuing growth, is probably fairly well established by
influences of family, church, and peer groups prior to a student's
entry into law school.
Professor Theodore Newcomb, a social psychologist who has done
extensive research and writing on the impact of college on students,
recently stated in an interview that there is very little change that
occurs in college students that is not equally matched in persons
of similar age who do not go to college.' 8 He further observed that:
[M]uch of what colleges are supposed to do is predetermined by

the kinds of people who are admitted in the first place ....
In
fact, a stronger case could be made for the argument that attitudes
stabilize during college rather than change. While the data are
limited, they show rather consistently that there is little change
after college, even on the part of those who have changed in
college. It is probable that noncollege people don't change much,
either, after the age of 21 or 22.19
While Professor Newcomb recognizes that peer groups and the
accepted norms of a reference group, including a college with an
established image or value reputation, can effect changes in students, he observed that there isn't much evidence that faculty have
20
any affect upon students.
These comments of Professor Newcomb somewhat glibly summarize an extensive review which he and a colleague have written of

the various studies which have been made of the impact of college
on students. 2 ' These studies generally do conclude that students'
18. C. Tavris, "What Does College Do for a Person?" "Frankly, Very Little." A Conversation with Theodore Newcomb, 8 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept.
1974, No. 4 at 73.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 73-74.
21. K. FELDmAN & T. NEWcOm, THE IMPAcT OF COLLEGE ON STUDENTS
(Jossey-Bass 1969).
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attitudes change while in college, and in some regards in a different
degree than students of similar age who do not go to college. The
nature and degree of change, however, tend to vary with the attitude or value being tested (for example, they become more aesthetic, liberal, and intellectual and develop a higher level and
more flexible sense of moral judgement while becoming less moralistic and religious), as well as the type of school attended, major
field of study, living arrangements, peer group contact, and extent
of faculty interaction, among other factors.
Perhaps the most extensive survey of changes in law school ethical attitudes was conducted by Professor Wagner Thielens of
Columbia University's Bureau of Applied Social Research. 22 He
surveyed the responses to questions designed to elicit ethical attitudes of entering students at four eastern law schools in 1961 and
of these same students when they were graduating in 1964. While
the students' ethical orientation, both as entering students and
graduates, was not particularly impressive, there was a slight net
average change toward more ethical positions, from 54.4% at entrance to 60.8% at graduation. Nevertheless, this average change
masks what may be a much more significant change in individual
student ethical responses. According to the questionnaire responses, 20% of the students switched to a more ethical stance while 15%
of them responded in a less ethical manner. Thus, changes in opposite directions cancelled each other out and tended to produce a
small net change even though over a third of the individual students did experience a change in their ethical attitudes while attending law school.
Interestingly, in surveying practicing lawyers in New York on the
same set of questions employed by Thielens, Dr. Carlin found a
slight decrease in ethical responses by members of the Bar to
52.8%.23

An earlier comparative study of law and medical students revealed that law students became less cynical and more humanitarian during their legal education while medical students
had atti24
tude shifts in the opposite directions, at least at Yale.

22. Thielens, The Influence of the Law School Experience on the Professional Ethics of Law Students, 21 J. LEGAL ED. 587, 590-91 (1969).
23. Carlin, supra note 16, at 144.
24. Eron & Redmount, The Effect of Legal Education on Attitudes, 9 J.
LEGAL ED. 431 (1957).

All of these studies are subject to methodological and other criticism, and further *tudy is undoubtedly called for to determine the
relative influence on the ethical attitudes of a lawyer of factors
such as inner disposition, peer group norms, curricula and faculty
exposure, and situational controls. Nevertheless, the existing studies do suggest some useful hypotheses: (1) Legal education has apparently contributed little to the overall ethical posture of law
school graduates; (2) Law students are not entirely immune from
change; (3) Some methods of inculcating some student attitudes
hold more promise than others.
SOiVIE SUGGESTIONS FOR EFFECTIVE PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY TRAINING

While a reorientation of legal training cannot guarantee against
future Watergates or more common varieties of lawyer malfeasance, some progress toward a more ethically abiding Bar can be
made if appropriate means are utilized to influence those student
values and attitudes still subject to change after a person has endured at least twenty-one years of life and sixteen of formal education.
To begin with, we must identify the professional responsibility we
hope to inculcate. What are the values and attitudes that a lawyer
should possess?
I propose a functional definition: The lawyers' professional
responsibilities are all those things that lawyers, individually and
collectively, must do to best effectuate the role of lawyers in
society.
The first element of professional responsibility training should be
an exploration and evaluation of what useful roles lawyers have
performed and can perform in our society. This inquiry involves
aspects of history and anthropology as well as philosophy and
sociology. From the former two disciplines, we learn that law and
lawyers, whether in primitive or sophisticated form, whether labeled
as such or not, are essential elements of all organized societies. If
the main purpose of lawyers is to make law work, then the lawyering role is inevitably tied to the function of law in society, a matter
which also involves inquiries of a jurisprudential and sociological
nature.
Among the recognized roles of law are the establishment of justice, the accommodation of maximum freedom with essential peace
and order, the satisfying of human wants and desires, the settling
and preventing of disputes, and other methods of ordering human
conduct in accordance with the perceived goals of the society. In
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the United States, law has played a particularly important role. As
De Tocqueville recognized, the high regard and respect for the rule
of law, and the key role of lawyers, characterized our early government and society to a greater degree than that of almost any other
nation.25 Woodrow Wilson's comment that in America almost
every question of public policy seemed eventually to become a legal
issue -0 has proved to be not only accurate history but prophecy.
The law has led the way to or expressed an American moral consensus on desegregation of the races and other civil rights, allocation
of political power among the people and as between the states visa-vis each other and the federal government, and on the very issues
of the creation of life (birth control and abortion) and its termination (capital punishment and organ transplants). To the astonishment of most of the rest of the world, we "have let the law take
its inexorable course against top government officials right to the
' 27
presidency itself.
The general acceptance of these legal dispostions has not been
based upon necessary agreement with the result but on respect for
the due process of law. This concern with adherence to process,
even to correct defects in the legal process itself, is embedded in our
Constitution and national fibre and constitutes the essence of the
rule of law in the United States. 28 Implicit in this process is a valuing of the importance of means over ends. It is this concept that
we reaffirmed through the triumph of constitutional government
over Watergate, and, ironically, this same concept which was not
sufficiently appreciated by the Watergate conspirators.
G. Gordon Liddy, in his CBS televised interview on January 5th,
1975, acknowledged this when he reasserted his belief that the end
justifies the means. Oddly enough, he projected this same view to
United States District Judge John Sirica. Perhaps Judge Sirica's
use of the sentencing threat to break the Watergate conspiracy of
silence can be so characterized, but his overall performance in presiding over the Watergate grand jury and the various trials appear
to illustrate the operation of due process of law under very difficult
circumstances.
25. A. DE TOcQuEviLLE, DEMOCRACY nT A

cA (A. Knopf ed. 1946).

26. Wilson, supra note 7, at 421.
27. Cribbet, Legal Education and the Rule of Law, 60 A.B.A.J. 1363, 1364
(1974).
28. Id.

It may be that the law schools have to some extent contributed
to this ends justifies the means philosophy of the Watergate culprits. There is a difference in application, but not in underlying
principle, between those who would state that it is a lawyer's duty
to use any means (legal or illegal; honest or dishonest) to get his
client off or otherwise achieve a victory and those who would break
into a psychiatrist's office or engage in illegal wiretapping in the
name of national security or to get their candidate elected and save
the world from George McGovern. The duty of loyalty owed to a
client comes not from the force of an employment contract or from
game-like competitiveness, but from the lawyer's role in serving the
administration of justice. To be effective, this system demands that
lawyer-representatives be loyal and zealous on behalf of their
clients as well as competent, truthful, and fair. Inherent in the
legal system that gives rise to these duties is the limitation that they
be executed within the law.
Elliot Richardson noted in the Watergate conspirators the danger
and predictable consequences of joining an obsession with winning
with an uncritical belief in the complete rightness of one's own
patriotic motives. 29 It is ironic that those who most vocally condemned and actively prosecuted civilly disobedient protestors
against the Vietnam War later could only
weakly justify their own
30
lawlessness as "serving a higher cause.1
We must encourage our law students to accept the priority of
process over results and means over ends both explicitly through
explorations of the role of law in society in Professional Ethics,
Legal Process, and Jurisprudence courses, and implicitly by the
stated or unstated assumption of the importance of the rule of law
throughout the curriculum. 31 In my mind, so long as we have a
legal process that establishes means for redressing grievances and
correcting injustices, including those in the process itself, there is
no proper place in the lawyer's arsenal for violations of law, or
even civil disobedience, to achieve the same ends. It is equally a
contradiction in terms to violate a person's legal rights in the name
of law and order or to seek "justice" "for the cause" or for an individual client by means of violence or falsehood. This does not
preclude law violations as test cases. They are a recognized part
of the legal process. Nor need it dissuade those who choose to serve
a perceived higher law with which the state's law conflicts, but
29. Speech to the American Bar Association Annual Meeting, Honolulu,
Hawaii, August 15, 1974.
30. The analogy is recognized, and carried too far in Bickel, Watergate
and the Legal Order, 57 COMMENTARY, Jan. 1974, No. 1, at 19.
31. See Cribbet, supra note 27. See also D. Weckstein, A Coordinatet
Approach, in Weckstein, supranote 15, at 188-98,

(VOL. 12: 261, 1975]

Watergate and the Law Schools
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

they must realistically weigh the consequences of criminal and professional sanctions versus a perhaps more nebulous higher reward.
The state of mind of a civil disobedient lawyer or other person,
nevertheless, is an appropriate consideration in determining the extent of professional discipline or other earthly punishment, if any
be merited under the circumstances.
For those lawyers who disclaim professional responsibility for the
Watergate offenses because they were not committed while the individuals were engaged in lawyering activity, I suggest they look
at the nature of the alleged crimes and their impact on the administration of justice: obstruction of justice, subornation of perjury,
destruction of evidence, filing false statements, perjury, interference with a criminal investigation, misuse of internal revenue laws
and information, and conspiracy to commit most of these. This was
not a case of a vacationing lawyer having too much to drink. No
one who had studied, and understood, the roles of lawyers in society
could tolerate the professional membership of individuals who
would employ such means for any purpose, no matter how desirable
the end sought. Moreover, lawyers have a special competence and
traditional involvement in the operation of government. Although
such activities are not within the profession's exclusive monopoly,
and shouldn't be, to deny a useful lawyering role is to go against
history and, I believe, the public interest. Indeed, law school
courses in Administrative Law, Legislation, Criminal Procedure,
Judicial Administration-as well as Legal Profession and Jurisprudence and others, ought properly to include explorations of the
lawyer as public servant, judge, legislator, prosecutor, administrator-and of the ethical issues likely to be encountered in such activities. Recognition of this lawyer role and its study in law school
could also lead to governmental reforms to guard against future
Watergates.
In addition to teaching the importance of the lawyer's role as
guardians of due process of law, law school study of the functions
of law and lawyers can lead to an acceptance of the social utility
of such functions. Such understanding and acceptance provide an
important incentive to live up to those professional responsibilities
that are necessary to make the lawyer's role effective. Awareness
of the likely consequences, should the legal profession default in
its societal roles, may well instill a higher level of professional
behavior than would the generally ineffective threat of disbarment

or other professional sanctions. Discipline from within is far more
meaningful, pervading, and generally more efficacious than the remote apprehension of an irregularly and infrequently applied
potential external discipline.
As recognized by Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone in his 1934 Ann
Arbor address:
Men serve causes because of their devotion to them. The zeal of
the student for proficiency in the law, like that of his elder brother
at the Bar, comes from a higher source than selfishness. It is
devotion to his conception of a useful and worthy institution ....
[It is for the institutions of the law] to impart a truer understanding of the functions of those who are to be its servants. That
understanding will come not from platitudinous exhortation, but
from knowledge of the consequences of the failure of a profession
to bear its social responsibilities .... 32
Another valuable objective in encouraging understanding of the
societal functions of lawyers is that it furnishes a basis on which
to formulate specific ethical standards as well as a criterion by
which to test existing formulations. The 1958 Statement of the
Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility well expresses
these considerations:
A true sense of professional responsibility must derive from an
understanding of the reasons that lie back of specific restraints,
such as those embodied in the Canons. The grounds for the lawyer's peculiar obligations are to be found in the nature of his calling. The lawyer who seeks a clear understanding of his duties will
be led to reflect on the special services his profession renders to
society and the services it might render if its full capacities were
realized. When the lawyer fully understands the nature of his
office, he will then discern what restraints
are necessary to keep
33
that office wholesome and effective.
Other than a respect for the rule and instrumentalities of law,
what are the other professional responsibilities needed to effect the
lawyer's societal role?
For purposes of illustration, and at the risk of oversimplification,
I suggest that the lawyer's role in our society basically includes:
aiding in the establishment, operation, and improvement of the
processes of law and government; articulating, responding to, and
interpreting law related manifestations of individual and societal
needs and demands; and individualizing the necessary generality
34
of the law.
Among the particular tasks that lawyers have performed to carry
out their general functions are giving advice, negotiating, litigating,
32. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar,48 HARV. L. REv. 1, 14 (1934).
33. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44
A.B.A.J. 1159 (1958).
34. See id.; Cheatham, The Lawyer's Role and Surroundings, 25 RocKy
MT.L.Rzv.405 (1953).
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drafting, investigating facts, researching law, lobbying, adjudicating, and advocacy, as well as acting as a broker, providing public
relations, securing financing, lending emotional support, and being
a scapegoat. 35 But the appropriateness of each to the lawyering
role must be evaluated in light of the uniqueness of legal training,
client expectations, and social good.
A study now being undertaken by the American Bar Foundation
is attempting to further identify what lawyers actually do. Additional studies will be necessary before appropriate societal roles for
lawyers can be postulated. Only with such information, can any
definitive statement of the lawyers' concomitant ethical responsibilities be formulated.
Nevertheless, based upon the lawyer's known and accepted functions, a number of recurring responsibilities can be tentatively
identified: knowledge of law, legal processes, political theory,
human behavior, and social and economic organization and relations; skill in operating within the legal processes and in advocating
the interests of those represented; loyalty and zealousness on behalf
of those represented tempered by an overriding fidelity to legal institutions and societal goals which requires honesty and fairness
in relationships with clients, other lawyers and their clients, and
agents of the lawmaking, interpreting, and applying instrumentalities; and making such legal services widely available without cost
being an inhibiting factor. A system dependent upon lawyer
representation to make it work must make available the services
of such lawyers to all who can benefit by them.
How can the law schools best contribute to inculcating these
types of professional responsibilities? Obviously, the law schools
can and have played a useful role in transferring knowledge and
perfecting skills, although we may not have yet reached the
optimum balance among undergraduate institutions, law schools,
and the practicing bar for the teaching of interdisciplinary learning,
communication of legal knowledge beyond basic fields, and the socalled practice oriented skills other than legal analysis and research.
By contrast, existing studies indicate that the law schools cannot
expect to have any significant impact upon character traits such
as honesty, loyalty, and fairness which are part of an individual's
35. See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON,

3 (Bobbs-Merrll 1967).

LAWYERS

AND

THEIR

WORK, ch.

probably previously formed inner disposition. Likewise, zealousness, discretion, sensitivity and other such responsibilities that may
be implied in the lawyer's role are personality traits which are also
largely determined prior to entrance to law school.
It is simplistic, however, to assume that once we recognize these
traits as being important to the lawyer that they will find easy
application in practice. In numerous situations these responsibilities may conflict or their application may be far from apparent.
For example, how does a lawyer resolve his obligation to be truthful with his obligation of loyalty to a client who has confided to
the lawyer that he has committed or is about to commit a criminal
act? How does a lawyer exercise his zeal on behalf of a client who
disrespects and is contemptuous of the legal system which the lawyer is sworn to serve? How can a lawyer fulfill his fiduciary obligations to two criminal defendants being jointly tried, or to a driver
and passenger in the same accident, or to a husband and wife or
business partners seeking to resolve their differences or dissolve
their relationship? How can a lawyer accommodate a reasonable
expectation to be compensated with the need to provide legal services for all who may need them regardless of the ability to pay?
Is there any legitimate public interest in limiting the extension of
legal services through advertising and solicitation by lawyers? If
so, where should the line be drawn, and why? Should there be
any inhibition upon a lawyer seeking to reduce the cost of legal
services by arranging for non-lawyers to render them in whole or
in part?
As in any law course, the first step to learning is to recognize
the legal issue. Thus, on one level, law school courses can sensitize
students to issues of legal ethics. Again, as with most all legal subjects, authoritative sources can be consulted for answers: statutes,
codes of ethics, adjudicated cases, and opinions of bar association
committees on legal ethics. These sources, of course, provide only
one answer at a particular time and place, and they can be
evaluated in light of closer analysis, experience, and changing conditions, and, altered in the future.
In short, useful and normal roles that legal education in professional responsibility can perform are an identification and study
of the problematical situations which give rise to issues of legal
ethics, 36 a knowledge of the existing standards for resolving those
36. An excellent course book for this purpose is R. MATHEWS, PROBLEMS
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (6th Printing
1974). See also Mathews, A Problem Approach, in Weckstein, supra note
15, at 69-74.
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issues, and an evaluation of whether such standards help effectuate
or perhaps present obstacles to the fulfillment of the lawyer's role
37
in our society.
While in some quarters the concept of professionalism is debunked, I believe that the study of lawyers as professionals can
be a valuable educational enterprise. The idealistic elements of a
profession should be identified and explored: primacy of service
over profit, complex skills or extensive learning, standards of ethics
and entrance and continuing controls to maintain them, (because
of inadequacy of lay persons to timely perceive infractions). These
elements may then serve as criteria by which to measure the performance of the organized bar and the legal profession in general
and provide goals for continuing improvement. 38 Once again, "the
fulfillment of function is substituted as a social force ... [to]
breathe the inspiration of service." 39
Most all of the aspects of a lawyers' professional responsibilities
suggested can probably best be explored in a concentrated course
in Legal Ethics, Professional Responsibility or Legal Profession.
There are reasonable disputes as to whether such a course should
be offered in the first, second, or third year, be required or elected,
be taught by full-time professors, practitioners, or both, and what
the precise coverage and number of credits should be.40 These are
pedagogical problems best left to the pedagogs, the law school
faculties, who have properly resisted the attempt to impose a
specific formula for instruction by state bar admission authorities
and ABA acreditation standards. My own preference would be to
introduce the role of the lawyer and nature of professionalism in
the first year, perhaps in a Legal Process or Introduction to Law
course, to be followed by an upperclass two or three credit course
37. A high quality comprehensive but slightly dated course book for
COUNTRYMAN & T. FINMAN, THE LAVYER IN MODERN
SOcIETY (Little Brown 1966), supp. by R. MELOTr (1971).
Other good but

these purposes is V.

more traditional casebooks for use in a course of this nature are M. PIRsIG,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. West 1970); S. THURMAN, E. PHILLPs,
E. CHEATHAM, THE LEGAL PROFESSION (Foundation 1970). See also Weckstein, supra note 15, at 41-62, 75-87.
38. See Weckstein, Training for Professionalism, 4 CONN. L. REV. 409

(1972).

39. MacIver, The Social Significance of Professional Ethics, 297 ANNALS
Am. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 118 (1955), reprinted in part in PuisiG, supra
note 37, at 54, 59-60.
40. See Weckstein, supra note 15, at ch. 3.

largely concerned with sensitizing students to the problematic situations in which ethics issues arise and evaluating the standards used
to resolve them. Whether this course should be required or elective
would depend upon the extent to which such considerations were
discussed in other courses by use of the pervasive approach.
In the studies of the impact of college on student values and attitudes, it is often noted that a greater degree of change is occasioned
when desired values are exposed and reinforced in many ways, from
admissions policy through educational techniques and extra-curricular activities. 41 Thus, we cannot expect significant-nor anyvalue inculcation from a single course. It is apparent that there
are counter forces at work during law school. For example, the
uplifting value of a one-hour a week lecture on professional platitudes by a principled professor in a required course in Legal Ethics,
if it is to have any more affect than weekly church services of similar duration, can be easily offset by other faculty members who
when confronted with ethical questions plead lack of time, ignorance, or, even worse, irrelevancy to the importance of the "legal"
subject matter. Likewise, we have little awareness of the positive
or negative influences of fellow students and student organizations
and of the increasing exposure through clinical programs and parttime employment to members of the practicing bar and judiciary.
We would like to think that all of these influences are favorable,
but recent experiences with honor codes and student cheating and
plagarism and Carlin's study of limited sections of the practicing
bar, as well as the pervasiveness of the Watergate scandal, gives
us cause for concern and for further study.
What is needed is a coordinated approach. 42 This would include
an introduction to the philosophical and historical roles of law and
lawyers, further exploration of such issues in perspective courses
and seminars, a concentrated course dealing with the problematical
situations and sociology of the legal profession, extensive use of the
pervasive approach to raise, discuss, and examine upon ethics issues
in all courses, a carefully controlled and faculty supervised clinic
program including opportunities to discuss ethical questions in context, structured exposure to role models from the practicing bar
and through readings and instructor identification, and an opportunity for students to exercise professional responsibilities through
student honor codes and their administration, and participation in
local, national, and student bar activities. A truly coordinated ap41. See note 21, supra; Dressel & Lehmann, The Impact of Higher Education on Student Attitudes, Values, and Critical Thinking Abilities, EDUCATIONAL RECORD 248, 256 (Summer 1965).

42. See Weckstein, supra note 15, at 188.
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proach cannot be limited to academic contacts. The desired value
orientation, if it can be agreed upon, should be reflected in promotional literature, catalogues, admissions policy, and to the extent
feasible, student organizations and peer contacts. The goal is to
structure the law school experience in a manner that is most likely
to bring about frequent individual changes in the direction of higher
professional ethics while guarding against slippage in the opposite
direction.
Can all this be done? I doubt it. Should all this be attempted?
I doubt it; but we should encourage consideration of some of these
and other alternatives. To be too one dimensional in value orientation would probably result in teaching counter values by example.
Restrictions would be placed on freedom of inquiry, speech, and
association for both faculty and students. Unlike the Watergate
culprits, we must not let the end justify the means.
The teaching of values is a very difficult enterprise. We must
be careful to teach, not to preach. Emotional acceptance may well
follow intellectual understanding but it cannot be coerced. Alexander Meiklejohn reminds us:
Here, as in all teaching the only essential is that one's methods

shall be true to ones purpose. Like teaches like. If you wish your

pupil to lie, you need only lie to him. If you wish your pupils

to become cruel, be cruel to them.
...This means for example, that the teacher of freedom cannot
'sell' it as a bill of goods. Nor can he impose it by compulsion ....
And this being true, the teacher of democracy may not .

.

. propa-

gandize. He may not skimp or twist evidence. He may not use
his pupils
the arts of salesmanship. He may not entice or delude
43
into the truth. He must practice what he preaches.
And Robert Matthews observes:
The learning process in a free country must abhor the coercion of
values, of their insinuation without an understanding espousal. We
must devote ourselves to discovering a means of training in the
capacity to perceive the presence of an ethical issue, to appreciate
the values at stake and the considerations which must govern a
choice between them. We must hope that the choice will then be
wise, but we must protect the freedom to make a choice we deem
unsound, even the freedom to reject the very values we treasure
most. Only in this way can we engage in a process of teaching
that is consistent with the values we cherish and with the fundamental faith on which our institutions rest; only in this way can we
43. A. Meiklejohn, "They Were Teachers," in a tribute to Louise Pettibone Smith and Royal France.

introduce into our national
life persons sincerely dedicated to the
44
American tradition.

Obviously, the lessons of these two powerful passages from two
great teachers were lost on the lawyers involved in Watergate. Or
were they ever exposed to such lessons? Law schools often
demonstrate by example lessons quite inconsistent with the values
we profess. Psychiatrist-law teacher Andrew Watson suggests that
a partial cause for Watergate was the failure of the law schools
to develop an emotional coping-capacity in their graduates. Indeed,
he rightly asserts that:
[LIaw students spend three years in an atmosphere which teems
with intellectual activity and ideas, but which at the same time,
constantly obscures, downgrades or actively criticizes emotional
issues and reactions .

.

. They logically deduce that if they are to

be competent, effective and respected lawyers, they must learn how
to banish emotionality
from their lawyer work. Such a goal . .
is totally delusional. 4 5
While these are sound observations, it would be a mistake-and a
rejection of a prime educational mission-if we were to go to the
excess of encouraging a "revolution of unreason." Rationality is
still the key to the legal process and the lawyer's role therein.
Dr. Watson recommends that the law schools should offer many

opportunities-in Legal Profession courses, other classes, taught
Socratically or not, clinical programs, and on final examinationsfor their students to encounter and struggle with knotty ethical
conflicts.
It is clear that what we are doing now is inadequate. To a large
extent people behave as they are expected to behave, and their
expectations arise less from what they are told than from the
examples they observe. The examples law schools frequently project by begrudging one-credit courses and instructor ignorance and
apathy in regard to ethical issues is one of unconcern and cynicism.
While short of the optimum, a simple commitment to seek and try
more meaningful methods of teaching professional responsibility
can make an important contribution to student perceptions of lawyer values.
The law schools still sow the seeds of future Watergates. But,
hopefully, the weed-like growth of the instant one will inspire
dedicated efforts and active research and experimentation to eradicate its roots.
44. R. Mathews, The Lawyer as a Community Leader, in CONFERENCE ON
37 (U. Chicago 1952).
45. Watson, The Watergate Lawyer Syndrome: An Educational Deficiency Disease, 26 J. LEGAL ED. 441, 443-44 (1974). See also Watson, The
Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. Cmx. L. REv. 91 (1968).
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